Carlyle and the French Enlightenment: transitional readings of Voltaire and Diderot by Hochstrasser, Timothy
  
Timothy Hochstrasser
Carlyle and the French Enlightenment: 
transitional readings of Voltaire and Diderot
 
Working paper 
Original citation: 
Hochstrasser, Timothy (2007) Carlyle and the French Enlightenment: transitional readings of 
Voltaire and Diderot. Working Paper. London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21432/
 
Originally available from Department of Economic History, LSE
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2008 
 
“The Nature of Evidence: How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel?” is funded by The Leverhulme Trust and 
the ESRC at the Department of Economic History, London School of Economics. 
 
© 2007 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers on The Nature of Evidence: 
How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel? 
No. 21/07 
 
 
 
 
 
Carlyle and the French Enlightenment:  
Transitional Readings  
of Voltaire and Diderot 
 
 
 
 
T. J. Hochstrasser 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 © Tim Hochstrasser 
 Department of International History 
 London School of Economics 
 
         September 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The Nature of Evidence: How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel?” is funded by 
The Leverhulme Trust and the ESRC at the Department of Economic 
History, London School of Economics. 
 
 
For further details about this project and additional copies of this, and 
other papers in the series, go to: 
 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collection/economichistory/ 
 
 
 
 
Series Editor: 
 
Dr. Jon Adams 
Department of Economic History 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London, WC2A 2AE 
 
 
Tel:  +44 (0) 20 7955 6727 
Fax:  +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 
 
Carlyle and the French Enlightenment: Transitional Readings of 
Voltaire and Diderot 
T. J. Hochstrasser 
 
Abstract  
Thomas Carlyle’s writings are an important conduit for the 
transmission of French and Ge rman ideas into England during 
the nineteenth century – and Carlyl e’s antagonistic relationship 
with the French Enlightenment would have a significant and 
durable effect upon Victorian attitudes to French thought. But 
although his antagonism was assumed to be inveterate, in fact, a 
variety of opinions can be isolated in his writings which indicate a 
more nuanced reading. This is especially the case in early essays 
on Voltaire and Diderot, which reveal a much more positive set of 
interpretations that are never refuted in his subsequent writings, 
even though later Victorian writers took their intellectual bearings 
from Carlyle’s later works. The reintegration of these texts allows 
for a better understanding both of the growth of Carlyle’s 
admiration of late-eighteenth century German culture and his 
vexed and contradictory relationship with its French counterpart. 
 
 
*   *   * 
 
To me the 18th century has nothing grand in it except that grand 
universal suicide, named French Revolution, by which it 
terminated its otherwise most worthless existence with at least 
one worthy act – setting fire to it s old home and self; and going up 
in flames and volcanic explosio ns in a truly memorable and 
important manner.1  
 
As many scholars have noted (most recently and eloquently, Brian 
Young), Thomas Carlyle’s final large-scale historical work expresses 
massive disapproval for the French eighteenth century and its 
intellectual products.2 Although in part a deliberate self-conscious 
Gothic ruin itself, Carlyle’s The History of Frederick II of Prussia  makes 
                              
1 Thomas Carlyle, The History of Frederick II of Prussia, called Frederick the Great. 8 
vols. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1897, orig. 1858-65) vol.1.8-9 
2 Brian Young. The Victorian Eighteenth Century. An Intellectual History.  (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2007), esp chs. 1 & 2. 
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a powerful claim for Ge rmany and – by implicat ion, German thought – 
as the true progenitor of nineteenth-century Victorian moral and political 
ideology. In this essay, however, I hope to re-direct attention towards 
two early essays that Carlyle wrote on Diderot and Voltaire which 
indicate that his evaluation of and response to the French 
Enlightenment was a good deal more complex than the splenetic bluster 
quoted above would sugges t. These writings reveal a much more subtle 
relationship on his part with the Enlightenment, and if we are to 
understand the full range of his thought in this area the early essays of 
the 1820s and 1830s, written well before the grand-scale histories of the 
French Revolution and the Reign of Frederick the Great, and even 
before Sartor Resartus (1833-4), deserve further scrutiny. Once built 
into the trajectory of his thought we  can see that his range of responses 
to the culture of eighteenth-century France was both more varied and 
sympathetic than is often thought. 
This is the period of Carlyle’s literary apprenticeship in which he 
moves from what is essentially the hack work of the biography of 
Schiller through to a mature set of essays which revolve around studies 
of Goethe, Jean-Paul, and other contemporary German literary and 
philosophical writers. The best known is perhaps the essay “The state 
of German Literature” of 1827, but he also translated the Wilhelm 
Meister novels, and began one of his own, Wooton Reinfred, in the 
same vein, abandoned unlamented by author and public at chapter 
eight. Less well known are the studies of Voltaire (1829) and Diderot 
(1833), which provided a parallel and countervailing interpretation of the 
French Enlightenment which cannot be understood outside the broader 
interpretative framework that his study of German  philosophy had 
provided for him.3  
                              
3 Thomas Carlyle, Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. 3 vols. (London, 1869), 
Voltaire, vol. 1: 355-417 [originally a review of rival memoirs in Foreign Quarterly, 6 
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Carlyle’s autodidactic pursuit of German language, literature and 
philosophy had begun initially as an attempt to gain access to new 
developments in continental scientific writings, which were the basis of 
his original research interests before literary and historical priorities 
asserted themselves and he committed himself to German Romanticism 
as a whole, possibly under the stimulus of reading Mme de Stäel. The 
influence of Coleridge’s writings on Germany are also cited by some 
authorities, but the evidence for this is thin, and in any case Byron’s 
suggestion, in Don Juan, that Coleridge’s reading of German idealist 
philosophy and literary criticism deterred as much as encouraged 
interest in the Britain of the 1820s. Clearly key contributions were made 
by Julius Hare, John Sterling and the combination of GH Lewes and 
George Eliot, but other less likely figures should also be mentioned, 
such as the genial Sydney Smith, who gave the first series of lectures 
on Kant’s philosophy as early as 1804, while cheerfully admitting that he 
really only felt equal to expounding Kant’s ideas on aesthetics. Despite 
some distinguished studies of the mediating of individual authors, 
including Carlyle himself, the study of the reception of German thought 
in the early nineteenth century in Great Britain still awaits its modern 
author.4
Whatever the sources, the new focus on German ideas and 
authors brought with it two important consequences: firstly the new 
emphasis on German materials carried wi th it an explicit or implicit 
downgrading of the French Enlightenment and its values in which 
Carlyle was the most notable and influential exponent, but by no means 
alone in his views. The concept of the Counter-Enlightenment is not 
often applied to England, but in a real sense the development of new 
                                                                                     
(1829)]; Diderot, vol. 2: 403-73. [originally a review of Diderot’s works in Foreign 
Quarterly Review, 22.1 (1833)] 
4 For Carlyle’s relationship with German thought and culture see esp. Elizabeth 
M.Vida. Romantic Affinities: German Authors and Carlyle: A Study in the History of 
Ideas (Toronto, 1993) and Rosemary Ashton, The German Idea: Four English 
Writers and the Reception of German Thought, 1800-1860. (Cambridge, 1980). 
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literary and philosophical priorities of an idealist kind was at the 
expense of the dominant figures of  the French Enlightenment, already 
under attack from Burke and Gibbon in different ways in the 1790s. 
Reception in newly accessible form of the works of Kant, Goethe, 
Fichte, Richter, Schiller and Novalis, to name only a few, promoted a 
form of philosophical transcendentalism that was almost always 
accompanied by a critique of the rationalism, scepticism and alleged 
atheism which were associated with the thinkers of the French High 
Enlightenment. Secondly, we need to note that often what mattered 
most in this process of assimilation was not the accuracy or plausibility 
of the reading of the intentions of the German thinkers, but rather the 
fashion in which their ideas were compounded so as to address a set of 
concerns that were local and not necessarily shared by the German 
thinkers themselves. 
Carlyle, for example, is often and rightly criticised for never 
properly understanding the range and implications of Kant’s philosophy; 
but that criticism essentially misses the point that he was seeking to use 
elements from Kant to support intuitions that he had already identified in 
Goethe. His concerns were focused on finding a way of rescuing the 
social force of religious belief from scepticism so that traditional moral 
nostrums would not lose the power of religion to act as social cement. 
German writers could be deployed to  provide a theoretical apparatus 
that would enable an “affirmative yea” to be maintained, and inhibit the 
kind of decay of the society of orders in Britai n that that the French 
Revolution had brought about on mainland Europe. 
So, in brief summary, Fichte was invoked to provide an idea of 
the man of letters who could act as the prophet of a transcendental 
order. Goethe then is interpreted as the embodiment of how this is to be 
done, and becomes Carlyle’s own model. Throughout, the reading of 
Goethe is highly selective, restricted mostly to Wilhelm Meister and 
sections of Faust. His role is to show what the transcendental values 
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are and the demands they make upon human conduct as defined by 
Carlyle. Here in Goethe is the origin  of the “hero” figure or prophet, 
originally restricted to literary or philosophical figures and only later 
turned to political ends (and losing its plasticity of embodiment along the 
way). Ultimately, as we shall see, in later years the despotic monarch is 
alone considered sufficient to oppose democracy, industrialisation and 
liberal cant. In the unlikely but necessary figure of “Frederick” the hero 
becomes a figure capable of resisting the contemporary forces that 
Carlyle laments. His concept of the hero-figure turns from the literary 
(Goethe) to the political despot who compels rather than persuades: for 
only such a person can command and re-direct the “signs of the times.” 
But even in the 1820s the ima ge and symbol of Goethe is 
insufficient on its own: Kant is invoked by Carlyle to offer a vision of a 
material universe that was still inter-penetrated with spirit. Idealism, for 
Carlyle, was not a matter of philosophical logic: that was no use to him. 
Instead it was a way of gaining inwa rd insight into truth and intuitive 
knowledge. By this mean s the world could be re-integrated despite the 
loss of faith into a single consciousness. This reconciled intellect and 
moral sense, yielding a description of the world as well as a source of 
prescriptive guidance and lessons. Such a reading of German Idealism 
gave a priority to literature and history over philosophy because the 
former crystallised character and event and narrative so as to make the 
moral point more embedded and accessible to the reader. German 
Idealism, according to Carlyle, pres erved a social role for religion and 
celebrated the way in which literary and historical truth could assist in 
realizing the full potential of huma n nature by teaching, reassurance 
and interpretation for contemporary citizens. 
What matters here, as I have said, is not the accuracy of Carlyle’s 
reading of the German thinkers, but th e eclectic use he made of their 
insights into the potential for history as a discipline which could interpret 
the present as well as evoke and bring to life the past. He appreciated 
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that literary forms were now as valid as philosophical ones as means for 
discussing epistemological questions,  a view that was also strongly 
influential on George Eliot and George Lewes through Carlyle’s 
example. As George Eliot wrote: “W hen he is saying the very opposite 
of what we think, he says it so finely, with so hearty conviction… that we 
are obliged to say ‘Hear! Hear!’ to  the writer before we can give the 
decorous ‘Oh! Oh!’ to his opinions.” 5   
The essays on Voltaire and Diderot, were written against the 
background of Carlyle’s escape through German Idealism from the 
crisis of faith that he experienc ed at the end of his education at 
Edinburgh. Part of that process of re-orientation required him to 
repudiate as a set of polar opposites the very views and heroes that he 
had previously revered. So he presents a view of the Enlightenment that 
selects, stresses and condemns empiricism in philosophy, scepticism 
towards revealed religion, a primarily utilitarian view of morals, a 
scepticism towards traditional forms of authority (especially the “society 
of orders”), hostility to enthusiasm and a preference for “common 
sense” and the world of observed fact. This is further reinforced in the 
1830s by his growing hostility to Benthamite utilitarianism where he 
argued that all human relations were being reduced to mechanical 
interactions and the “cash nexus.” These themes are retrospectively 
projected back onto the ei ghteenth century, and Diderot and Voltaire 
are the most eminent targets of this guilt by association (though the 
critique is extended to Scotland too).  
Yet, there is rather more to these essays than the creation of a 
myth of villainy and ascription of responsibility for the evils of the French 
Revolution. Firstly, Carlyle is unable to stick to his task of repudiation 
and is honest enough as a historian to find all sorts of points at which he 
can admire Diderot and Voltaire; wh ere his honesty as an intellectual 
                              
5  G.Eliot, The Leader 6 (27 Oct 1855). 
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historian, who cared about accurate sources, compels him to argue 
against himself. Methodologically, this is itself of interest as these 
essays show the beginnings of Carlyle’s habit (prefiguring what we’ve 
come to call “post-modern”) of breaking up the narrative with different 
“voices” and opinions within his own authorial personality, so tense and 
taxing does the intellec tual navigation become. 
And the second general point of interest in both essays is the way 
in which he tries to blame the eighteenth century for having an 
inadequate epistemology in  its attempt to interpret the world. Drawing 
on Kant he argues that there is a contrast between “understanding” 
(Verstand) and “reason” (Vernunft)’ which is recognised by all the 
German Romantics and ne ver penetrated by the Enlightenment. For 
Carlyle, “understanding” deals with the capacity to analyse and 
calculate the outer world of appearances, while “reason” offers insight 
into the transcendental ideal nature of things and values. The French 
Enlightenment offered a one-eyed vision of understanding to which 
German philosophy was the antidote. There is a case to be made that 
this is the most consistent and lasting influence on Carlyle’s historical 
method drawn from German y. Though there is not much reference to 
individual German Romant ics after the 1830s in Carlyle’s books, this 
contrast between the world of appearances and the world of real 
rational truth is one that provides a golden thread of interpretation down 
to Past & Present (1843), Cromwell (1845), and Frederick II (1858-65). 
It explains, for example, his contin uing interest in theodicies, and 
the palpable existence of divine puni shment for sin – for there must be a 
return and the breakthrough of the Real into the web of corruption 
cyclically bred in different societies. True Reason corrects the defects of 
understanding. Political and social revolutions, on this account, deserve 
the attention of the historian because they provide a moral reckoning for 
the achievements and failures of societies, and a providential 
accounting for them before God. This  was indeed the impetus behind 
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the project on Oliver Cromwell that even tually mutated into the edition of 
the Letters and Speeches. 
Thus Carlyle’s historiography takes up a position ultimately that 
stands about as far from the idea of “philosophic history” championed 
by Voltaire, as it is possible to be: his prophetic use of the “Ancient 
Monk” episode in Past & Present is about as far from eighteenth-
century models as it is possible to move: a twelfth-century monastic 
community in Bury St Edmund’s bec omes the embodiment of the moral 
ideal of an intact community of reciprocal values, which is capable of 
valorization in the present, even if its trappings are no longer relevant. 
Bonds of community not the “cash nexus” and in dividualism tie this 
monastery, and a responsible hero, Abbot Sampson, directs it. What for 
eighteenth century historians could only be a Goth ic nightmare, is for 
Carlyle a moral lesson that aims to redeem the 1840s by rebuking the 
eighteenth century. 
Before scrutinising the essays on Voltaire and Diderot in detail, 
two more general contextual observat ions are appropriate. We need to 
remember that Carlyle’s focus as a mature historian is two-fold: he 
certainly wishes to offer accurate history, so far as he can, and is 
concerned to find and use the best sources where possible; but 
ultimately the point and justification of  history for Carlyle, is not accuracy 
or the truth for its own sake, but rather the use of the past to influence 
the shape of the present. Partly this was driven by a sense of the 
challenge of the times in which he lived, and the difficulty inherent in a 
post-revolutionary era of finding a shared discourse of moral authority to 
inhibit a recurrence in Britain of th e apocalypse – as he saw it – of 
France. But it was also driven by a philosophical belief, drawn from the 
German Romantics, that truth as Vernunft revealed itself above all in 
symbolic form. The highly charged emotive rhetoric that became known 
later as “Carlylese” was justified in hi s view, not just or even mainly as a 
literary experiment, but as a way of  showing where truth lay in a 
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symbolic form that all readers could thereby have access to and inhabit. 
To modern readers that ambition can all too often topple over into what 
reads as a hyperbolic ranting (reminiscent of the worst excesses of 
Herman Melville, on whom Carlyle had exerted a formative influence 6 ). 
But, at its best, Carlyl e’s symbolism shows that a historiographical 
balance can be achieved between deploying the full resources of 
imagination and not stretching the background facts unreasonably. His 
best work allows for multiple levels of meaning to operate across his 
work, both explicitly and implicitly , that amount to an imaginative 
recreation of the topic both as history and as a source of explicit 
parallels between the France of the mid-eighteenth century and Britain 
in the 1830s. Those of us who pay lip-service to the importance of 
imagination in historical writing, should pause before condemning 
Carlyle for attempting a genre where the line between success and 
failure is inevitably as narrow as one metaphor that tips from well-
judged evocation into abys mal attention-seeking. 
Near the start of the essay on Voltaire, which is ostensibly a 
review of a series of conflicting contemporary memoirs of him, Carlyle 
concedes that he is dealing with the figure, who with the single 
exception of Luther, has developed a reputation and influence that is 
truly European in scope: he deserves treatment “neither from the parish 
belfry, nor any Peterloo platform; but if possible from some natural and 
infinitely higher point of vision.”7 Accordingly, Carlyle begins with a 
careful reading of the available memoirs and accounts of Voltaire’s life, 
and remarks fairly enough that his career had always been controversial 
and divided contemporary opinion. He acknowledges what he calls 
Voltaire’s adroitness in managing his career, and while this may be 
damning with faint praise, his account of Voltaire’s skill in seeking out 
                              
6  See, for example, A. Welsh, “A Melville Debt to Carlyle,” Modern Language Notes, 73.7 
(1958): 489-91. 
7 Carlyle. CME. I, 365. 
9 
publicity and in developing his personal finances is even-handed so that 
his description of Voltaire displaying “unrivalled expertness of 
management” which is “in turns imperious and obsequious,” culminating 
in the final return to Paris in 1778 is perfectly fair; and it is 
unexceptionable an d correct to state that Voltaire in effect “drowns in an 
ocean of applause.”8 Carlyle encapsulates his reading in a fine set-
piece description of Voltaire’s triumphal if ultimately fatal return to the 
city and his apotheosis at a production of Irène, a vignette that takes the 
reader to the heart of events with both vividness and panache. 
Always one with a keen eye for mixed motives and moral actions 
undertaken for immoral reasons, Carlyle notes Voltaire’s role as a 
benefactor of the underprivileged and campaigner for good causes and 
the correction of miscarriages of ju stice; for “should the uncharitable 
even calculate that love of reputation was the sole motive, we can only 
remind them that love of such reputation is itself the effect of a social 
and humane disposition.”9  He also offers a much fairer summary of 
Voltaire’s troubled dealings with Frederick the Great than other 
commentators, and indeed he himself in his later over-lengthy, point-
scoring treatment in the Reign of Frederick II. Among his writings 
Carlyle singles out for praise Voltaire’s History of the Reign of Charles 
XII (which is striking given the way that work had been savaged by 
Macaulay):  
the clearest details are given in the fewest words; we have 
sketches of strange men and strange countries, of wars, 
adventures and negotiations, in a style which, for graphic 
brevity rivals Sallust. It is a line- engraving, on a reduced scale, 
of that Swede and his mad life; without colours, yet not without 
the fore-shortenings and perspective observances, nay not 
altogether without the deeper harmonies, which belong to a 
true Picture.10  
 
                              
8 Ibid. 390-6. 
9  Ibid. 369. 
10 Ibid. 402. 
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Overall he finds his history-writing both well-ordered and clearly 
structured – “not a mere show-room of  curiosities, but truly a museum 
for purposes of teaching; every object is in its place and there for its 
uses.”11
Moreover, Voltaire’s contes receive high praise as products of 
both wit and shrewd observation. Candide offers, says Carlyle, “the 
sharpest glances, though from an obliq ue point of sight, into at least the 
surface of human life, into the old familiar world of business… and 
yields store of ridiculous combinations. The Wit, manifested chiefly in 
these and the like performances.. has been often and duly 
celebrated.”12
However, it is at this point with the invocation of Wit and its 
tendency to develop into ridicule, scoffing, and lack of earnestness that 
the argument of the piece begins, for the first time, to turn into a 
negative critique. Carlyle views Voltai re’s wit as a purely destructive 
instrument that “earns abundant triumph as an image-breaker, but 
pockets little wealth.”13 Here the importance of Carlyle’s philosophical 
idealism begins to reveal itself as he goes on to condemn Voltaire 
because “he sees but a little way into Nature: the mighty All, in its 
beauty, and infinite mysterious grandeur, humbling the small Me into 
nothingness, has never for moments been revealed to him.”14 He fails 
above all to understand the social importance of religion: “the Divine 
Idea, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance” was never more 
invisible to any man. He reads History not with the eye of a devout seer, 
or even of a critic, but through a pair of mere anti-Catholic spectacles: 
“It is not a mighty dream, enacted on the theatre of Infi nitude, with Suns 
                              
11 Ibid. 400. 
12 Ibid. 402. 
13 Ibid. 371 
14 Ibid.  
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for lamps and Eternity as a background.. but a poor wearisome 
debating-club dispute between the Encyclopédie and the Sorbonne.”15   
In other words Voltaire rema ins caught in the world of 
appearances without access to the transcendent truth; he misses true 
faith in his concentration on condemnation of doctrine, and thus despite 
his role as a leader of the Enlightenment, capitulates before the 
demands of “no higher divinity than Public Opinion.” Without the stable 
moral compass provided by access to the deeper ‘reason’ of religion, 
Voltaire prefers “truth but chiefly of the triumphant sort” which is “less 
the produce of Meditation than of Argument.”16  His first question with 
regard to any doctrine, perhaps his ultimate test of its worth and 
genuineness is: “Can others be convinced of this? Can I truck it in the 
market for power?”17 To this extent Carlyle actually prefers the 
philosophy of Rousseau, which was always based on “passion” rather 
than “prudent calculation.”18  
Now there is obviously a temptation to dismiss this judgement 
out-of-hand, as purely a product of Carlyle’s own determination to do 
down Voltaire in favour of German thinkers, to find grounds for 
downgrading the eighteenth century in preference to his own; but before 
we do so we should acknowledge two points in Carlyle’s favour. Firstly, 
his pin-pointing of the awkward and unstable relationship between the 
philosophes and public opinion (should they lead it or be led by it? 
Where is true reason to be assessed before its tribunal? should there 
be a set of shared values among the “party of humanity,” and if so, who 
should define it?) is one that is still very much part of the current 
historiographical agenda of the French Enlightenment. Carlyle is not 
entirely off target here.  
                              
15  Ibid. 371-2. 
16  Ibid. 375. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Although in The French Revolution this characterisation of Rousseau provides the 
basis for a stinging and constant critique, here he is content to designate him as ‘half-
sage, half maniac’. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, Carlyle steps back to a degree 
from his critique of Voltaire’s pers onality by immediately following his 
argument with the concession that Voltaire’s faults are those of his age 
as much as of his nature. The lack of transcendence that Carlyle 
laments in Voltaire is attributed to the exclusion of intellectuals from 
participation in public policy-making, the decay and corruption of the 
governing order in France, and the frivolity of the court. Here in its 
distilled essence we have the argument of Carlyle’s The French 
Revolution (1837), which does not blame the Enlightenment per se (and 
in the manner of de Tocqueville) fo r undermining confidence in the Old 
Regime, but instead sees it as part of a larger crisis in the governing 
capacity and moral will of the social elite – an ar gument very similar to 
Burke’s in Reflections, though there it is not clear that that Carlyle ever 
seriously grappled in detail with Burke’s case. The philosophes use a 
‘merely argumentative Logic’ to pursue their case, and are excluded 
from governance by those who cannot even defend themselves with 
logic and seek refuge in the defunct weapons of persecution – “in such 
a state of things there lay abundant principles of discord.. for there is no 
conducting medium to unite softly these hostile elements; there is no 
true virtue, no true wisdom on one side or the other.”19   
The essay ends with a long statement of how Voltaire’s faults 
were those of the “spirit of the age,” that the collapse of the French state 
bore some comparison with the decline of the Roman Empire, save that 
the survival of the institutions of Christianity after the Terror had 
preserved hopes of maintaining public and private virtue intact in one 
form or another. What Carlyle is doing here for the first time in his work, 
is stating that social forces and circumstances determine thought rather 
than arguing that ideas shape social outcomes. The position where he 
comes to rest in this essay and in his later work on the French 
                              
19  Ibid. 373-4. 
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Revolution crystallises around the failures of the ruling class not merely 
or even mainly the French Enlightenment: moral failure on the part of 
the society of orders reaps the justif ied whirlwind. The revolutionary era 
is seen as a theodicy in which a just Providence is reasserted. The 
ruling elite is responsible for but not to the people over which it 
presides, and is open to divine punishment for neglect of its duties. 
There is a complex nexu s of rights and responsibilities between rulers 
and ruled that the rulers broke with first. Such a position is tactically 
useful to Carlyle in that it allows him to retain an admiration for some 
aspects of Voltaire’s work while also placing him on a lower pedestal 
then the German Romantics; but it al so remains a key general strategy 
throughout his historical writings, whether on the revolution in France, 
the Puritan Revolution analysed in Oliver Cromwell, or Frederick. As we 
shall see this was one of the most important and problematic aspects of 
his legacy to later Victorian intellectual historians, and it began in his 
handling of the French Enlightenment. 
The second essay, Diderot, echoes several of the themes set out 
in its predecessor but is altogether less impressive as a piece of 
intellectual history. Diderot matters less to Carlyle as a “hero and anti-
hero” than Voltaire and is more of a peg on which to hang a general 
essay on the evils of eighteenth-century French atheism. Moreover, 
Carlyle was writing at time when many of the works that we now admire 
most in Diderot’s canon, were not available or even known. Carlyle 
recognises this problem and indulges in some witty by-play at the 
expense of the chaos of the sources:  
from time to time some asterisk attracts us to the bottom of the 
leaf, and to some printed matter subscribed “editors,” but 
unhappily the journey is for the mo st part in vain; in the course 
of a vol. or two we learn all too well that nothing is to be 
gained there; that the Note, what ever it professedly treat of, 
will, in strict logical speech, mean only as much as to say: 
“Reader! Thou perceivest that we Editors, to the number of at 
1 4 
least 2, are alive, and if we had any information would impart it 
to thee!” 20  
 
Carlyle clearly prefers Diderot’s father, the knife grinder, to Diderot the 
philosopher, and there follows a long encomium on “cutlery” and its 
manufacture, which bows the knee before the sanctity of manual labour 
in Carlyle’s moral lexicon. 
Continuing in this vein it is Diderot’s labours on the Encylopédie, 
spread over two decades, that attract Carlyle’s highest praise, though 
he also finds space to admire Jacques le fataliste and Le Neveu de 
Rameau among Diderot’s personal writings. (It is no accident that these 
were the texts by Diderot that Goethe most admired too.) It is genuinely 
surprising to see how appreciative Carlyle is of Diderot’s art criticism, 
where the conventional view holds that his Salons reviews were 
neglected until the twentieth century. However, given Carlyle’s own 
predilection for the use of historical imagination to recreate the symbolic 
essence of an event, perhaps we should not find it remarkable that he 
responded to Diderot in these glowing terms:  
…we find the freest recognition of whatever excellence there 
is; nay an impetuous endeavour, not critically, but even 
creatively, towards something more excellent. Indeed, what 
with their unrivalled clearness, painting the picture over again 
for us, so that we too see it, and can judge it; what with their 
sunny fervour, inventiveness, real artistic genius, which wants 
nothing but a hand, they are, with some few exceptions in the 
German tongue, the only Pictorial Criticisms we know of worth 
reading.21  
 
Carlyle parts company with Diderot in exactly the same areas as 
he did with Voltaire: his support for materialism and mechanism evokes 
a fear in Carlyle of the social consequences of these philosophical 
commitments. For Carlyle there are no half-measures: such beliefs 
necessarily imply atheism and he gives Diderot credit for embracing 
                              
20 Carlyle, CME. II, 419. 
21 Ibid. 470. 
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them fully rather than hiding behind a contemptible “faint possible 
theism” which he finds endemic in the political establishment Britain in 
the 1830s. Again Diderot is seen as simply responding to the “spirit of 
the age” rather than acting as a main intellectual innovator: “the 
mouldering down of a Social System is no cheerful business either to 
form part of, or to look at: however, at length in the course of it, there 
comes a time when the mouldering changes into a rushing… of all 
labourers, no one can see such rapid extensive fruit of his labour as the 
Destroyer can and does.”22 Despite appreciative portraits of D’Alembert 
and Rousseau and the enlightened despots, the essay ends firmly in 
the conviction that the Enlightenment is a destructive rather than 
creative movement, even though that may not have been its intent. 
This critique of the French En lightenment develops further 
nuance and detail across his career, and embraces a more detailed 
examination of Rousseau and other philosophes too in The French 
Revolution; but in essence it does not change its contours. Rather it 
simply becomes more strident. Grad ually, in his handling of these 
authors Carlyle loses the faculty he often demonstrates elsewhere – 
and especially in his social criticism – of showing th e trade-offs and 
tensions between beneficial and harmful intellectual positions. Thus his 
reading of Voltaire in particular becomes cruder and more simplistic as 
his career progresses. This is most evident in his History of Frederick 
the Great, long judged a failure, and still of  interest as the end-point of 
Carlyle’s engagement with Germany and France, and with the thought-
world of the eighteenth century. Frederick is depicted as an authentic 
heroic national leader who displays realism and freedom from hypocrisy 
together with hard work and respect for facts that mark him off from the 
Enlightenment, though that is still blamed for his religious scepticism. 
Providence manifests itself in military victory for Frederick on behalf of a 
                              
22 Ibid. 417. 
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moral and earnest and pious Protestant Prussia and over the immoral, 
frivolous and sceptical Catholic France (here the background of 
diplomatic tensions that later led to the Franco-Prussian War is 
important). Voltaire is presented as a tiresome tempter who seeks to 
take the ruler away from his work and allotted task in pursuit of the 
fripperies of French culture. The best that Carlyle can find to say of 
each ultimately is that “Voltaire was the spiritual complement of 
Friedrich. What little their ‘poor Century… did, we must call Friedrich; 
what little it thought Voltaire. They are, for want of a better, the two 
Original Men of their Century.”23 Truly, as Jane Carlyle remarked, this 
final foray into the eighteenth century was a “jou rney through the valley 
of the shadow of Frederick” that added little of note to Carlyle’s existing 
interpretation of the Age of Reason, and little of prophetic insight for the 
Europe of the 1860s and 1870s. 
However, Carlyle’s gradual eclipse as both historian and social 
prophet did not mean that the influence of his reading of the 
Enlightenment declined. Far from it. Victorian England remained in thrall 
to his readings for some time to come, as we can see from a brief 
examination of the biograp hy of Voltaire published by John Morley in 
1872 and Leslie Stephen’s foray into the history of rationalist thought in 
England published in 1876. 24
One indicator of Carlyle’s success in occluding the importance of 
the French Enlightenment in general and of Voltaire in particular is the 
absence of general handling of the topic in English after Carlyle’s 
interventions. Up to the 1830s, Voltaire was celebrated as an apostle of 
toleration above all, but between Lord Brougham’s essa y on this theme 
and the presentation of Voltaire in Lecky’s History of Rationalism 
(1865), there are few treatments, and even in Lecky, the scope 
                              
23 Carlyle. Frederick the Great. Vol.3.177-8. 
24 John Morley. Voltaire (London: Chapman & Hall, 1872); Leslie Stephen. English 
Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. (London: Smith,Elder 1876). 
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assigned to Voltaire and other French thinkers is trifling in comparison 
with that given to Locke and English Deism. In further confirmation of 
this point, Morley’s biography suggests that the key formative phase in 
Voltaire’s career is his residence in England in the 1720s, which shaped 
his political thought and support for religious toleration ineradicably.25  
There is no attempt to recreate a separate conceptual space for a 
French Enlightenment alongside German idealism and English 
empiricism.  
Now of course the corrosive impact of Carlyle’s writings is not the 
sole explanation of this pattern of in terpretation. As Morley points out in 
the preface to his volume, during this same period that Carlyle is writing 
both liberals and utilitarians, who are perhaps most likely to be 
sympathetic commentators on the French Enlightenment, are engaging 
chiefly with the thought of Saint-Simon and Comte. For the latter 
thinkers Voltaire was an unsystematic and uncreative mind, not worthy 
of the “spirit of system,” and thus this dismissive view prevailed from the 
other side of the political divide too. As Morley explains, it was only 
when liberal commentators escaped both their reliance on Comte and 
also no longer regarded Carlyle’s critique of Voltaire’s “irreligion” as a 
disqualification that a new reading of Voltaire and of the French 
Enlightenment as a whole could appear. Morley, following Carlyle’s 
focus on social forces a stage further, argued that Voltaire had been 
compelled by the circumstances of censorship and persecution by 
church and parlements to a stronger critique of the social role of religion 
than was justified; and in the circ umstances he had no choice. This, 
however, did not in any way undermine his role, newly presented by the 
Gladstonian Liberal Morley, as a cham pion of the rights of man and the 
role of reason in promoting practical social reform.26  Indeed Morley 
went on to write studies of Burke and Rousseau enrolling them in the 
                              
25  Morley. 1872, ch.2. 
26  Ibid. 36-42. 
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Liberal party pantheon too. Now this vision of the French Enlightenment 
was as much present-centred as Carlyle’s had been, but it was also 
very much a response to the exam ple Carlyle had already offered in 
using Enlightenment thought to fight contemporary battles. 
At the time of writing his History of English Thought in the 
Eighteenth Century (1876), Leslie Stephen frequently found himself 
posing this question: “Why had the work of eighteenth-century 
scepticism to be done all over again in the nineteenth century?” “Why 
had the work of Hume and Voltaire to be repeated?” In Britain, Stephen 
and others gave the reason simply as the impact of evolutionary 
theories of Darwin and of other kinds on the very concept of a 
metaphysical explanation for the orig in of the cosmos, which had been 
left intact during the Enlightenment, even in the works of Hume and 
Voltaire. But another part of the answ er may lie in the consistent down 
playing in the Britain of the first half of the nineteenth century of the 
work of the French Enlightenment, and its place in intellectual 
historiography. Even when that place was restored in the later 
nineteenth century much of the intellectual scope of the French 
Enlightenment, as it was understood by Gibbon, Hume and Smith, was 
omitted or truncated. We have only to think of the rich French context 
that John Pocock has recovered fo r Gibbon’s Enlightenment to see how 
that contemporary sense of a shared intellectual project between 
England, Scotland and France had totally gone by the early nineteenth 
century.27 In that explanation Carlyle’ s work, with its wide-ranging 
literary impact, and its promotion of German thought over  French, surely 
played an important role. 
Finally, the long shadow cast by Carlyle’s reading of the French 
Enlightenment may help to explain on e of the more puzzling aspects of 
Stephen’s History – namely the conflict betwe en the statement in his 
                              
27 See, for example, J.G.A.Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. I: The Enlightenments of 
Edward Gibbon, 1763-4. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP), Part 2. 
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preface that social conditions and structure shape the development of 
ideas, and his actual practice in the book, where he restricts himself to 
describing the inter-connections and conflicts between the thinkers 
themselves, with little or no reference to social context. Why does he 
not follow his stated precepts? Again, it was suggested at the time that 
Stephen was really trying to apply Darwin to the history of thought, but 
baulked at the idea of conceding that rationalist and deist thought had 
actually lost out to the Evangelical revival; that, in other words, the very 
notions whose history he proposed to write were not winning the 
evolutionary struggle. Be that as it  may, it is hard to see why Stephen 
would have exposed himself to this co ntradiction unless he felt that after 
Carlyle any intellectual historian had to at least flag up the importance of 
social context in determining the ba ttle of ideas, especially one where 
the battle between science and theology seemed to revive the 
confrontation between reason and dogma dramatised by Carlyle in his 
own history of the era of the French Revolution. 
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